Why the offer mattered
Banking has been one of the hardest parts of building Crypto Dispensers. An account could be approved, operate for a time, and then close. Each closure meant finding another way to receive funds, pay expenses, and keep serving customers.
BankLine had helped us obtain banking relationships before. After an application process that began in 2021, we received approval for an account at Georgia Primary Bank in May 2022. That did not resolve every operational problem, but it gave us another route to keep the company running.
In October 2022, a man named David Levine contacted Crypto Dispensers through customer support. He offered help with banking, cryptocurrency ATMs, and liquidity. Those were the problems occupying my attention every day.
The following month, a Secret Service agent also contacted the company through support to discuss cooperation against fraud. At the time, I believed both contacts were approaching a legitimate business in good faith.
In February 2023, Levine introduced us to Prime Trust. On March 1, he introduced me to attorney Sasha Hodder to discuss an account at BankProv. On March 10, our Georgia Primary accounts were closed. His proposed banking solution through Mercury and Choice Financial Group became more urgent because the company again needed a dependable way to move money.
How the relationship gained credibility
Levine described himself as working in strategic development for Freeda Inc. He made introductions and spoke confidently about banks, compliance, exchanges, and liquidity. Some connections involved real professionals, which made other parts of the arrangement appear credible.
Sasha had represented Levine and agreed to discuss banking for Crypto Dispensers. I remember her vouching for him. The written correspondence also showed an existing professional relationship, and she later acknowledged having represented both of us. That reassured me at the time; it does not establish that she knew about the conduct I later reported.
Other people were presented as representatives of financial institutions or as legal and compliance contacts. In my complaint, I identified a purported lawyer named Yohan Lee, purported Choice representatives Megan Hill-Glover and Alexander Bell, a purported Mercury compliance employee named JB Kim, and a purported OKCoin representative named Pablo Margo. I am describing the identities presented to us, not verifying that the named people held those roles.
I also met Levine in Los Angeles. At dinner, he told me his credit cards were not working and asked me to pay. It seemed odd, but it did not outweigh months of introductions and formal-looking correspondence. In hindsight, small inconsistencies look much clearer than they did while I was trying to keep the company operating.
Sending money to an account I could not access
From April through July 2023, approximately $150,000 in ACH deposits moved from Green Dot Bank into the account provided through the arrangement. Another $60,000 was wired to what had been represented as a required savings account for our cryptocurrency operations.
The funds were connected to customer deposits and the company's ability to fulfill orders. We needed access to the money to obtain and deliver cryptocurrency. But access to the promised account never arrived.
There was another approval, a technical problem, a compliance review, or a transfer said to be on its way. Meanwhile, the business still had customers to serve and expenses to pay.
In August, I asked Sasha to prepare a settlement. On August 15, she declined because of her prior representation of both sides and referred me to other counsel, including Michael Frisch. Mike began examining the correspondence and the proposed banking arrangement. I remember him initially being skeptical of my suspicions. He wanted to test the story against the documents.
An agreement dated August 17 required Freeda to transfer $148,126.18 to Crypto Dispensers by August 30, with additional provisions if the promised resolution failed. A separate $4,100 BankLine invoice also became part of the correspondence. On August 18, Sasha wrote that she had sent the wire for that invoice; the settlement record described the payment as one Freeda made for us. That real payment made the larger relationship harder for me to understand.
The main repayment deadline passed without the promised resolution. New explanations and dates followed. I was still trying to determine where the money was and how the company could recover it.
We contacted Mercury directly
On September 21, 2023, we reached Mercury's real support team independently. Mercury told us that two addresses used by purported Mercury and Choice representatives were not genuine. It advised us to stop responding to those senders, make a police report, and work with Green Dot to dispute the transfers.
That response changed how I understood the earlier correspondence. The signatures and logos had looked official. The institution itself was now telling us that key communications had not come from genuine addresses.
On September 22, Levine wrote to me and my lawyers accepting responsibility, apologizing, and saying repayments would begin the following Monday. The next day, in a message to my lawyer, he denied involvement in fraud and said Freeda was also a victim.
Those positions did not resolve what had happened. They became part of the record I wanted investigators to examine.
I filed the federal complaint
Early on September 25, 2023, I filed a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. I identified Virtual Assets LLC, doing business as Crypto Dispensers, as the victim business and described what I believed was a six-month scam led by Levine.
The report included the banking communications, the purported contacts, transfers, account information, and Mercury's response about the false domains. I certified that the information was true to the best of my knowledge. We preserved correspondence and worked with counsel to organize the record.
Later that day, Levine asked my lawyer to confirm a Bitcoin address for repayment. He then said he had sent approximately $1,135 in Bitcoin, supplied a transaction identifier, and described the remaining main balance as $147,000.
Two days later, I contacted an FBI representative to ask for help escalating the complaint. I explained that we were working with the institutions involved and believed the matter required federal attention. I wanted investigators to follow the information beyond what we could establish ourselves.
The meeting with the Secret Service
On November 29, 2023, Special Agent Nick Schlereth of the Secret Service's Chicago Field Office contacted me. He said the IC3 complaint concerning Levine had been forwarded to him and asked to learn more about the incident and the company.
Mike responded and offered to walk the agents through the documents. On December 6, at about one in the afternoon, we met with two agents at a Chicago law office. The meeting lasted approximately thirty minutes.
Mike brought a binder containing correspondence and the contract. We explained the proposed banking relationship, the movement of funds, the domain verification, and the impact on the company. The agents asked how I had met Levine, how the arrangement worked, and about the Bitcoin address associated with a partial repayment.
Afterward, Mike sent transaction information and confirmed the request for the settlement agreement. The agent thanked him. I believed the records gave investigators a practical starting point.
I received no meaningful explanation of what followed. I was not told whether Levine had been questioned, whether the payment trail had been traced, or whether the matter had been declined. I cannot infer from that silence that no investigative work occurred. I can describe the absence of an answer to me.
Repayment discussions continued
We kept trying to recover the money privately. After reviewing the records and dealing with Levine, Mike's assessment changed. In correspondence, he described barriers to repayment as fabricated and said he believed he had evidence of financial crimes. Those were his conclusions in the exchanges, not a court's findings.
Levine continued to deny theft while discussing money owed and proposing methods of payment. The explanation moved among loans, commissions, exchanges, escrow, Bitcoin, USDT, ACH, and installments. A broader proposed settlement also appeared in the discussions, but a proposal was not a completed recovery.
Some payments arrived. The correspondence includes a reported $2,000 payment in February 2024, a further $500 promise, a $4,000 payment discussed in May, and proposed $5,000 installments in June. The main problem remained unresolved.
By January 2026, I was still asking whether payments would resume. My lawyers warned that civil litigation could cost more than we were likely to collect. Even a favorable judgment would not guarantee recovery if reachable assets were unavailable.
What I know and what I do not
I believe Levine scammed me and the company. That is my conclusion from the events and correspondence described here. It is not a criminal judgment.
The records I describe document the introduction, transfers, settlement, Mercury's response, complaint, interview, and repayment discussions. They also preserve Levine's denials and changing explanations. Those facts should be considered together.
I cannot tell the public where every dollar went. I cannot establish Levine's motive, identify other victims, or say what investigators did without my knowledge. Those were among the reasons I sought law-enforcement help.
A business owner does not have subpoena power or access to every banking record. I could preserve what we had and explain it. I needed someone with investigative authority to answer the questions beyond our reach.
The government later accused us
On November 18, 2025, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois announced a money-laundering conspiracy charge against me and Virtual Assets LLC. The government alleged that I knowingly allowed criminals to use Crypto Dispensers to launder at least $10 million in proceeds from wire fraud and narcotics offenses. My company and I pleaded not guilty. The allegations require proof in court.
The contrast was difficult for me. In 2023, we had asked federal authorities to investigate a scam against the company. We retained counsel, organized the records, and met with agents. I had done those things because I believed the company had been harmed and the evidence deserved examination.
Reporting a crime does not establish innocence of a separate accusation. I do not offer the Levine complaint as a substitute for the evidence in our case. I include it because it is part of our history and of how we responded when we believed criminal conduct had reached the business.
I want both matters understood through complete records. My frustration does not relieve me of the obligation to distinguish what I know from what I believe.
Why I am writing this
The financial loss was only part of the cost. There were years of correspondence, legal expenses, missed deadlines, and time spent trying to understand what had happened. As a founder, I was responsible for keeping the company moving while that work continued.
I also want readers to understand how a real business problem can make an apparent solution persuasive. Independent verification should happen before money moves. A familiar logo, professional introduction, or reassuring email is not a substitute for contacting the institution through a channel you know is genuine.
I am sharing the account because I do not want silence to become the only record of the experience. I went to the government with counsel and documents because I believed facts would lead to an answer. I still want a meaningful explanation of what happened to the complaint and the money.
